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Infrastructure Development vs Direct Cash Transfer: A General Equilibrium 
Comparison  
 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to provide an explanation to the debate whether infrastructure 
development is more effective than direct cash transfer to reduce wage disparity 
between skilled and unskilled workers. We use a simple general equilibrium structure 
to argue that in the presence of symmetric productivity effects direct cash transfer meets 
the target when such transfer is financed by tax revenue collected from skilled wage 
bill. Nevertheless, in case of asymmetric productivity effects the arguments boil down 
to how different sectors absorb infrastructural facility to improve their productivity. 
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1. Introduction  
There has been a huge hue and cry over the issue of relevance and effectiveness 
of direct cash transfer to the poor. In India, it is observed that following economic 
reform in 1991 there is a policy of cutting down of transfer of funds to state from central 
level in order to reduce the fiscal deficit. This has led to a significant decline in 
production augmenting investment. On the other hand direct subsidies or cash transfer 
to the poorer and deserving segment is on a rise thereby worsening the public 
investment problem further1. These issues are highlighted in Jha (2007). Similar type of 
argument has also been described in a policy paper of OECD (2012). Moreover, this 
paper explains clear reasons of income inequality in the presence of taxes and transfers. 
Beside this, poverty-reducing policy implications drew much attention in the recent 
past since the rate of decline in poverty has been reduced in post reform period 
compared to 1980s. Bhattacharya, Romani and Stern (2012) is another important 
reference in this line. This paper focuses on the necessity of investment on 
infrastructure in developing countries, where transport, electricity connections etc are 
major components that come under infrastructure2. Papers by Kumo (2012) and Sahoo, 
Dash and Nataraj (2010) have also nicely pointed out the causality between 
                                                             
1 However, Standing (2007) has shouted that cash transfer is an effective way of combating poverty and 
economic insecurity.  
2 In this context one can also go through the following articles, namely, Easterly and Rebelo (1993), World 
Bank (1994), Yoshida (2000) and Kim (2006). It is to be noted that these studies have examined the impact 
of infrastructural investment on economic growth. Again, Ahmed, Abbas and Ahmed (2013) have 
claimed that in the long run public infrastructure investments have the same direction of impact whether 
funded by taxation or international borrowing. 
.   
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infrastructure investment and economic growth that runs both ways in the context of 
developing economy3. 
Conventionally, government collects revenue from various sources to finance 
such welfare policies. Economists, policy makers are not always of the view that an 
initiative like direct cash transfer to the poor has been very helpful in raising the relative 
status of the target group as the alternative mechanism normally raises investment in 
general. Investment in infrastructural development such as transport, electricity etc 
must induce some changes in the productivity of all economic activities. Hence the issue 
becomes very interesting from any welfare state’s perspective as to which alternative 
ends with better outcome. 
This paper focuses on the debate by starting with a simple general equilibrium 
structure where infrastructure influences productivity symmetrically. Government 
finances this through taxing the relatively rich and dividing the revenue between 
infrastructure development and direct cash transfer to poor or unskilled labor. Here we 
primarily look at the wage inequality between rich and poor and try to check the 
effectiveness of direct cash transfer in reducing inequality. So, in a sense our paper is in 
line with OECD (2012). We then extend the model for asymmetric productivity effect 
case. 
                                                             
3 These issues are also explained by Lall and Rastogi (2007). Their paper is primarily written with 
reference to India. 
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Remaining paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model with 
symmetric infrastructural benefits through productivity, per se. It has one subsection. 
Subsection 2.1 considers the impact of an increase in transfer share on wage inequality. 
The extension of the basic model has been considered in the section 3 and section 3.1 
considers the impact of an increase in transfer share on wage inequality in the presence 
of asymmetric benefits of spending on infrastructure. The last section winds up the 
paper with some concluding remarks. Mathematical details are, however, relegated to 
the Appendix. 
2. The Basic Model 
We consider a small open economy comprising of two sectors, one produces a 
skilled labour intensive good(X) with skilled labour (S) and unskilled labour (L). The 
second one produces an unskilled labour intensive product (Y) with same factors of 
production that have been used in the first sector. We further assume the presence of 
welfare state in the sense that total tax revenue (g) collected from of skilled labour is 
used either for ‘infrastructural development’ (g1) and ‘direct cash transfer to the poor’ 
(or ‘allowance’) (g2) in form of redistribution of λ proportion of total tax revenue (tWSS) 
only among unskilled labours or both4. We also assume that the portion of tax revenue 
that will be used for infrastructural development may improve the productivity of both 
sectors, which can be captured by the productivity parameter )( 1gα . Competitive 
                                                             
4 From a developing economy perspective we realistically assume that unskilled workers need 
not to pay income tax as their income is very low and does not fall in the taxable income 
bracket.  
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markets, CRS technology, diminishing marginal productivity and full employment of 
factors of production are also assumed5. 
The system of equations can be written as follows: 
Competitive price conditions imply 
SXS aW +W ( )1gPa XLX α=                                                                                                       (1) 
( )1gWaaW LYSYS α=+                        (2) 
Note that 0α > and ' 0α > as an improvement of infrastructure over the basic level 
raises productivity at a higher rate for that the system starts functioning very smoothly. 
Budget is balanced in the sense that total tax revenue is entirely distributed for two 
different welfare policies defined earlier. Hence 
( ) StWStWggg SS λλ +−=+= 121                                         (3) 
( ) StWg Sλ−= 11                                                                                                           (4) 
Full utilization of skilled and unskilled labour, respectively, imply 
                                                             
5 The following is the list of notations used in the model.  P X = world price X ; PY = world price 
of Y, we assume PY = 1;L = fixed number of unskilled workers; S = stock of skilled labour; aji = 
quantity of the jth factor for producing one unit of output in the ith sector,j=L, S and i = X, Y; θji  
= distributive share of the jth input in the ith sector; W = competitive unskilled wage rate ; WS = 
competitive skilled wage rate ; g = total tax revenue; g1 = part of total tax revenue used for 
infrastructural development ; g2 =  portion of total tax revenue that transferred to unskilled 
labour; λ = transfer share ;  t = tax rate; α = productivity parameter;   
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SYaXa SYSX =+                                                                                                                 (5) 
LYaXa LYLX =+                                                                                                           (6) 
This is a standard Heckscher-Ohlin set up a la Jones (1965). So, given PX and )( 1gα , WS 
and W can be determined from equations (1) and (2). Thus g1 and g2 are also solved 
from equations (3) and (4) if we start with some given t andλ . Since all factor prices are 
determined, aijs are calculated from CRS assumption. Hence X and Y are solved from (5) 
and (6). 
2.1 Increase in transfer share 
In this section we want to examine the impact of an increase in λ  on skilled-
unskilled wage gap. In the presence of government intervention by means of 
redistributing tax revenue an increase in 𝜆𝜆 implies higher 𝑔𝑔2 and lower 𝑔𝑔1. This in turn 
leads to low quality of infrastructure or governance in addition to a redistribution of 
revenue in favour of unskilled workers.  A ‘hat’ over a variable represents proportional 
change. 
Let us begin with an in increase inλ . From equations (1) and (2) we get (for details see 
Appendix 1), 
λεηθεθ ˆˆˆ)( =+− WW LXSSX                                                                          (7) 
λεηθεθ ˆˆˆ)( =+− WW LYSSY                                                                                     (8) 
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Where, 0)( 1
1
>=
αδ
δαε
g
g
and .0
1
<
−
−=
λ
λη  
Note that, when government redistributes tax revenue the relevant skilled and 
unskilled wages become SW  and W

 respectively. Therefore, post-tax income of the 
skilled workers become 
Where SS WWt
~)1( =−                                                     (9) 
Hence, proportionate change in pre-tax and post-tax skilled wage remain unchanged as 
t is given. So, equation (9) provides 
SS WW
~ˆˆ =                                                                              (10) 
Similarly, post transfer income of unskilled labour can be written as 
W
L
StWW S ~=+ λ                                    (11) 
The proportionate change in unskilled wage is represented as  
 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( )
d SWW W W
W W Wθ θ λ= + + 
                                                                          
(12)                                                                                                     
Where,
 LW
StW
W
W S
WW ~1~~ λθ −==  and ( ) /dW W W W Wθ = −
  .  
The analysis, however, would remain incomplete if we don’t allow the effect of 
government intervention on 𝑔𝑔1 which again depends on λ . When λ fraction of total tax 
revenue is used for direct tax transfer, (1 λ− ) is left for general infrastructure 
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development that should help increasing productivity in both X and Y. If one carefully 
looks at the structure, it could be easily understood that this change will have no effect 
on factor return as both the sectors are equally affected by )( 1gα . 
From equation (10) and (12) we get 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
dS W W
W W θ λ− = −                                                                                                           (13) 
From the above expression it is clear that for given PX and t, wage inequality will go 
down due to an increase in λ . The intuition behind the above argument is that a rise in 
λ implies more funds will be transferred from government revenue account to 
unskilled workers. W~ will increase. Now a rise in λ implies an increase in g2 and a 
decrease in g1. It is to be noted that a decline in g1 due to rise inλ  implies a reduction in 
productivity ( )( 1gα ) in both the sectors. Therefore, both of SW and W
 will go down 
equi-proportionately. Thus if an increase in W~  due to a rise in 𝑔𝑔2 completely offsets the 
reduction in W~  due to a fall in g1, wage inequality may fall as SW
~ also falls. Thus we 
propose that, 
Proposition 1: An increase in government’s direct cash transfer to unskilled workers 
will unambiguously lead to a reduction in wage inequality.  
 
3. Extended Model: Asymmetric Benefits of Infrastructure  
Here we assume that the portion of government tax revenue spends on infrastructural 
development (g1) in both skilled and unskilled labour intensive sectors affect both them 
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asymmetrically unlike the basic model. For brevity of analysis we assume that change 
in infrastructure affects sector X and sector Y by )( 11 gα and )( 12 gα ,respectively.  
Thus modified competitive price conditions can be written as  
SXS aW +W ( )11 gPa XLX α=                                                                                                       (1’) 
( )12 gWaaW LYSYS α=+                          (2’) 
Where, 0, 21 >αα and 0,
/
2
/
1 >αα . 
All other equations of the basic model remain unchanged. As the structure, number of 
endogenous variables and number independent equations are akin to the basic model, 
the working of the extended model would be similar to that of the basic model.  
3.1 Changes in transfer share  
In this section we also analyze the impact of changes in λ  on post-tax wage inequality. 
It is to be noted that the assumption of symmetric benefits of infrastructure on both 
sectors may not be plausible since in reality infrastructure affects both the sectors 
asymmetrically. For instance if we consider the case of power and road: where 
infrastructural development related to power may help skilled labour intensive sector 
more compared to unskilled intensive sector, whereas infrastructural improvement 
related to road may benefit sector Y more compared to sector X. Thus infrastructure 
generally have asymmetric effects on different sectors.   
Using (1’) and (2’) and after some algebraic calculation we obtain (see appendix 2 for 
detail derivation) 
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1 2
1
1ˆ ˆ ˆ{ ( ) }
dS WW W W
W W θ ε ε η θ λ
θ
− = − −                                                                            (3’) 
From expression (3’) it is evident that the movement of post-tax wage inequality may be 
positive or negative depending upon the relative value of 1ε  and 2ε . 
Case 1, where 21 εε > : Now, a rise in λ implies more funds will be transferred from 
government total tax revenue to unskilled workers and henceW~ will increase. Now a 
rise in λ implies an increase in g2 and a decrease in g1. Hence productivity of sector X 
declines more compared to sector Y, since 21 εε > ( i.e. 𝛼𝛼1(𝑔𝑔1) > 𝛼𝛼2(𝑔𝑔1) and both falls) 
Thus, SW
~ will go down and W~ will go up. Hence wage inequality woul fall due to an 
increase inλ . Equation (3’) also ensures that as by definition 
dW W
θ   must be very low 
relative to WWθ  . 
Case 2, where 21 εε < : In this case responsiveness of 𝛼𝛼 due to a change in 𝑔𝑔1 is higher in 
unskilled labor intensive sector i.e. 𝛼𝛼1(𝑔𝑔1) < 𝛼𝛼2(𝑔𝑔1). An increase in  𝜆𝜆  diverts more 
fund for unskilled workers and hence induces the first round increase in 𝑊𝑊.�  However, 
productivity effect hurts unskilled labor intensive sector more compared to skilled labor 
intensive sector. This calls for an increase in 𝑊𝑊�𝑆𝑆 and a decrease in  𝑊𝑊.�  Therefore, it is 
certain whether 𝑊𝑊�  eventually rises or falls. If falls, wage inequality unequivocally 
widens, but if it goes up, the subsequent effect on wage disparity remains unclear.                                                                    
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Proposition 2: A rise in government’s direct cash transfer to unskilled workers will 
unambiguously lead to a reduction in wage inequality if 21 εε > , but the effect is 
ambiguous if 21 εε < .   
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we tried to understand the theoretical underpinnings of a much 
debated question: whether direct cash transfer is better option than infrastructure 
development to ameliorate existing wage disparity between skilled and unskilled 
workers. Using a general equilibrium set up, where production of any good requires 
some basic infrastructure, it has been explained here that an increase in direct cash 
transfer to unskilled workers financed by tax revenue collected from skilled workers 
unambiguously reduces wage disparity if both the sectors experience symmetric 
infrastructural productivity effects. Interestingly when productivity effects are not 
symmetric, the result is not so straight forward. The eventual effect on wage inequality 
crucially depends on which sector is more responsive to any change in infrastructure 
development. So, we believe that a sound welfare policy with an eye to equity should 
not be ad hoc, but based on the nature of factor intensity of sectors and their capacities 
to appropriate infrastructural facilities through improved productivity.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: 
Differentiation of equations (1) and (2) gives us 
1ˆˆˆ gWW LXSXS εθθ =+                                                                                           (1.1) 
1ˆˆˆ gWW LYSYS εθθ =+                                                                                             (1.2) 
Here, 0)( 1
1
>=
αδ
δαε
g
g
 
From (4) one can obtain 
λη ˆˆˆ1 += SWg                                                                                                        (1.3) 
Where, .0
1
<
−
−=
λ
λη  
Using (1.3) in equations (1.1) and (1.2) we can get 
λεηθεθ ˆˆˆ)( =+− WW LXSSX                                                                                  (1.4) 
λεηθεθ ˆˆˆ)( =+− WW LYSSY                                                                                   (1.5) 
Arranging equations (1.4) and (1.5) we obtain 






=











−
−
λεη
λεη
θεθ
θεθ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
)(
)(
W
WS
LYSY
LXSX                                                                         (1.6) 
Solving equation (1.6) by Cramer’s rule we can obtain following expressions 
]ˆ})[{(1ˆ λεηθθ
θ LXLYS
W −=                            
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]ˆ})[{(1ˆ λεηθθ
θ SYSX
W −=
 
Here θ = )1)(( εθθ −− LXLY 0> under the assumption that 0<ε <1. Recall that LYθ > LXθ
because of factor intensity assumption. 
Now, ]ˆ}){(ˆ)}([{1ˆˆ λεηθθθθεθθ
θ SYSXLXLYXSYLYS
PWW +−−+−+=−  
Post tax income of skilled labours can be written as 
SSS WSStWSW
~
=−                                                                                                  (1.7) 
Therefore SS WWt
~)1( =−                                                                                         (1.8) 
Differentiation of equation (1.8) gives us 
SS WW
~ˆˆ =                                                                                                                  (1.9) 
Similarly, post transfer income of unskilled labour can be written as 
WLL
L
StWWL S ~=+ λ                                                                                            (1.10) 
W
L
StWW S ~=+ λ                                                                                                (1.11) 
Differentiation of equation (1.11) gives us 
)ˆˆ(~
)~(ˆ~
~ˆ λ+−+= SWW
WWW
W
WW                                             
)ˆˆ(ˆ~ˆ ~~ λθθ ++= SWWWW WWW S                                                                                   
(1.12) 
Where, 
LW
StW
W
W S
WW ~1~~ λθ −==  
From (1.12) we get 
λθθθ ˆˆ)1(ˆ~ˆ ~~~ WWSWWWW SWWW +−+=  
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λθθ ˆˆ)ˆˆ(~ˆ ~~ WWSSWW SWWWW ++−=  
Using (1.9) in the above expression and after some simplification we get 
 
λˆ~
)~()ˆˆ(~
~ˆ~ˆ
W
WWWW
W
WWW SS
−
−−=−                                                                  (1.13) 
Where, 
LW
StW
W
W S
WW ~1~~ λθ −==  
λθ ˆ~ˆ~ˆ ~WWS SWW −=−                                                                                                   (1.14) 
 
Appendix 2: 
Differentiation of equations (1/) and (2/)  
11 ˆˆˆˆ gPWW XLXSXS εθθ +=+                                                                                      (2.1’) 
12 ˆˆˆ gWW LYSYS εθθ =+                                                                                               (2.2’)  
Here, .0)(,0)(
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1 >∂
∂
=>
∂
∂
=
α
α
ε
α
α
ε
g
g
g
g
 
Using (1.3) in equations (2.1’) and (2.2’)  
ληεθεθ ˆˆˆ)( 11 =+− WW LXSSX                                                                                       (2.3’) 
ληεθεθ ˆˆˆ)( 22 =+− WW LYSSY                                                                                       (2.4’) 
Arranging equations (2.3’) and (2.4’) in a matrix form 






=











−
−
ληε
ληε
θεθ
θεθ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
)(
)(
2
1
2
1
W
WS
LYSY
LXSX                                                                              (2.5’) 
Solving equation (2.5’) by Cramer’s rule we can obtain following expressions 
]ˆ})[{(1ˆ 21
1
ληεθεθ
θ LXLYS
W −=   
18 
 
=Wˆ  ]ˆ})[{(1 12
1
ληεθεθ
θ SYSX
−     
Where, 0)]()[( 211 >−−−= εθεθθθθθθ LXLYLXSYLYSX                       
]ˆ})[{(1ˆˆ 21
1
ληεε
θ
−=−WWS                                                                                    (2.6’) 
It implies 0ˆˆ >−WWS  when 0ˆ >λ . 
From (1.12) and (1.9) we get 
λθθθ ˆˆ)1(ˆ~ˆ ~~~ WWSWWWW SWWW +−+=  
λθθ ˆˆ)ˆˆ(~ˆ ~~ WWSSWW SWWWW ++−=  
After some algebraic calculations we get 
]ˆ})(1[{~ˆ~ˆ ~21
1
~ λθηεε
θ
θ WWWWS SWW −−=−                                                              (2.7
’) 
 
